Quote:
Originally Posted by Lamplighter
... Some officials also believe that several more years of military pressure will persuade many Taliban fighters to switch sides rather than fight.
There are good reasons to be skeptical ...
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This was the problem Holbrooke identified and was so desperately trying to avoid. Just another reason why his death was such a major American defeat. He addressed realties that made Karzai, Generals, and other regional power brokers angry. Because, to some degree, they were all complicit in this problem. And because Holbrooke clearly saw Deja Vue Nam.
Reasons why America was defeated in Nam stem from factors obvious by 1963. That includes a most corrupt government. An army fighting only for money; not for the government or country. A people who regarded the government a greater threat than the insurgents. And a people who understand, "Fool me three times; shame on you. Fool me four times; shame on me."
We all know George Jr and his staff repeatedly said, "America does not do nation building." When he said that is when America may have been defeated in Afghanistan. A perfect example defined even by Sze Tsu on how to be defeated. We may just not yet know it.
We were defeated in Nam in 1963. Most Americans never learned this until 1972. Afghanistan may be Deja Vue Nam.
There may also be another problem. The military may have a different strategic objective from one necessary to have a victory. This was how Westmoreland also guaranteed an American defeat in Nam. This 'strategic' problem is not clear - if it exists at all. It may be why American generals were at odds with Holbrooke. They may be too focused on tactical objectives; do not see the strategic ones (which was a Westmoreland mistake).