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tw · 05-12-2010, 06:33 PM

Lies, lies, and more lies. And finally we are hearing what investigators have been confronting.

How much oil was flowing into the Gulf? From video, BP would have known this all along. That 18 inch diameter pipe was always flowing full open. Just from the video, BP knew oil flow was easily 200,000 gallons per day - probably more. BP hid this fact even when the White House demanded to know the numbers. BP made early statements such as 1000 gallons hoping that (for example) robot submarines would cut off the oil before we knew how extreme it was. Public image - to even deny to the White House the impending disaster - was more important.

The White House even demanded those videos. BP openly refused. BP would have known oil flow was maximum by simply measuring how quickly that massive oil cap 'filled'. And still BP would not admit the severity of that failure. Instead, only quietly admitting to the White House that the flow was probably worse than they had said - when BP already knew the numbers were worse.

BP told federal authorities that BP had plans for such 'accidents'. As the cap demonstrated, BP had no plans - no contingencies. BP built the cap from scratch without every having even tested this solution. Therefore BP did not even know about thermodynamic problems that would cause that cap to fail. BP did no plannnig for such leaks - another lie to federal authorities.

We now know that BP knew the blowout preventer had failed hours before an explosion occurred. Previous tests (including a negative pressure test) failed.

Worse, is the state of that blowout preventer. At least one critical hydraulic line was not tightened. Apparently one nut was many turns too loose. So hydraulic fluids, essential to prevent a blowout, could not flow.

Also in this safety device are two controllers for dead man operation. If nothing else worked, these electronics devices would initiate a safety cut off on their own. One controller was removed. Its battery was dead. That is typical when (due to problems directly traceable in management) basic maintenance is not performed. Why management is responsible for creating check lists and other procedures so that humans do not make mistakes.

Another system in the BOP would crush the pipe. Apparently the BOP did not have sufficient strength to crush that type of pipe. These kind of mistakes are not even close to being called an accident.

BP's knowledge for addressing this problem was so minimal that even Exxon had to teach BP that disperants should be applied directly into the well. Until informed by Exxon, BP did not even know this. So much for those existing plans that BP claimed to have.

Unknown is why this blow out occurred. However testimony from a support ship (asked to remain on scene due to unknown problems) observed a massive mud flow long before any explosion. So much mud as to pour from the rig's deck. Crews obviously knew long in advance that a problem existed. More than sufficient time to activate the blowout preventer. Eventually, mud was followed by a massive gas bubble (probably methane) that eventually filled rooms where the gas found ignition sources - exploded.

Unknown how long the blowout was ongoing before the entire rig eventually exploded. But this we do know. Crews knew for a serious problem existed with plenty of time to avert the disaster - if the so many safety systems worked. The ship that was asked to standby rescued all survivors - 115 of the 126 that were on that rig.

Every critical safety system on that BOP apparently was defective. BP knew long ago that they had bad wiring, a pressure problem, and that the BOP that had already failed a negative pressure test. All facts that BP would not admit to until Congress forced them to give up the documents.

We do not even know who asked that ship to standby - or why.

Meanwhile, we also know oil booms to contain oil are mostly for show. Those booms do nothing except in the most calm waters. Over three weeks later, we only only beginning to learn how much they knew - and did not want us to know.

Like Three Mile Island, the Challenger, and the Columbia - all failures directly traceable to multiple failures in top management. Lies, lies, and more lies from BP make this failure that much more suspicious.

Who technically failed to do their jobs? Halliburton? The BOP manufacturer? We do not yet know. What we do know is that BP has been lying repeatedly. That casts major suspicions on BP's topmost executives - whose actions would also explain the massive refinerary explosion in Texas and the Alaska pipeline failure directly traceable to maintenance that BP was paid to perform - and did not perform.

BP that called itself 'Beyond Petroleum' in an advertising campaign to promote itself as a 'green' company is also a boldface lying company - according to facts that were finally released.

05-12-2010, 06:33 PM	#55
tw Read? I only know how to write. Join Date: Jan 2001 Posts: 11,933	Lies, lies, and more lies. And finally we are hearing what investigators have been confronting. How much oil was flowing into the Gulf? From video, BP would have known this all along. That 18 inch diameter pipe was always flowing full open. Just from the video, BP knew oil flow was easily 200,000 gallons per day - probably more. BP hid this fact even when the White House demanded to know the numbers. BP made early statements such as 1000 gallons hoping that (for example) robot submarines would cut off the oil before we knew how extreme it was. Public image - to even deny to the White House the impending disaster - was more important. The White House even demanded those videos. BP openly refused. BP would have known oil flow was maximum by simply measuring how quickly that massive oil cap 'filled'. And still BP would not admit the severity of that failure. Instead, only quietly admitting to the White House that the flow was probably worse than they had said - when BP already knew the numbers were worse. BP told federal authorities that BP had plans for such 'accidents'. As the cap demonstrated, BP had no plans - no contingencies. BP built the cap from scratch without every having even tested this solution. Therefore BP did not even know about thermodynamic problems that would cause that cap to fail. BP did no plannnig for such leaks - another lie to federal authorities. We now know that BP knew the blowout preventer had failed hours before an explosion occurred. Previous tests (including a negative pressure test) failed. Worse, is the state of that blowout preventer. At least one critical hydraulic line was not tightened. Apparently one nut was many turns too loose. So hydraulic fluids, essential to prevent a blowout, could not flow. Also in this safety device are two controllers for dead man operation. If nothing else worked, these electronics devices would initiate a safety cut off on their own. One controller was removed. Its battery was dead. That is typical when (due to problems directly traceable in management) basic maintenance is not performed. Why management is responsible for creating check lists and other procedures so that humans do not make mistakes. Another system in the BOP would crush the pipe. Apparently the BOP did not have sufficient strength to crush that type of pipe. These kind of mistakes are not even close to being called an accident. BP's knowledge for addressing this problem was so minimal that even Exxon had to teach BP that disperants should be applied directly into the well. Until informed by Exxon, BP did not even know this. So much for those existing plans that BP claimed to have. Unknown is why this blow out occurred. However testimony from a support ship (asked to remain on scene due to unknown problems) observed a massive mud flow long before any explosion. So much mud as to pour from the rig's deck. Crews obviously knew long in advance that a problem existed. More than sufficient time to activate the blowout preventer. Eventually, mud was followed by a massive gas bubble (probably methane) that eventually filled rooms where the gas found ignition sources - exploded. Unknown how long the blowout was ongoing before the entire rig eventually exploded. But this we do know. Crews knew for a serious problem existed with plenty of time to avert the disaster - if the so many safety systems worked. The ship that was asked to standby rescued all survivors - 115 of the 126 that were on that rig. Every critical safety system on that BOP apparently was defective. BP knew long ago that they had bad wiring, a pressure problem, and that the BOP that had already failed a negative pressure test. All facts that BP would not admit to until Congress forced them to give up the documents. We do not even know who asked that ship to standby - or why. Meanwhile, we also know oil booms to contain oil are mostly for show. Those booms do nothing except in the most calm waters. Over three weeks later, we only only beginning to learn how much they knew - and did not want us to know. Like Three Mile Island, the Challenger, and the Columbia - all failures directly traceable to multiple failures in top management. Lies, lies, and more lies from BP make this failure that much more suspicious. Who technically failed to do their jobs? Halliburton? The BOP manufacturer? We do not yet know. What we do know is that BP has been lying repeatedly. That casts major suspicions on BP's topmost executives - whose actions would also explain the massive refinerary explosion in Texas and the Alaska pipeline failure directly traceable to maintenance that BP was paid to perform - and did not perform. BP that called itself 'Beyond Petroleum' in an advertising campaign to promote itself as a 'green' company is also a boldface lying company - according to facts that were finally released.