NASA Investigation Pointing at Tank Foam in Columbia Demise
 

Looks like the investigative board has had to accept the inevitable...that the foam which peeled off of the external fuel tank and struck the port wing of Columbia caused enough damage to allow hot gases to enter the wing structure on reentry, thus dooming the shuttle.

I would hate to be any of the guys who said that it was okay, let it land, the foam couldn't have done that much damage...

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmp..._investigation

Boeing has oversight on this program. A month before the last flight, the Boeing people in CA that have been doing the risk/damage assessment and management since right after the Challanger crash were laid off. In a cost cutting move, the work was assigned to the Boing people in TX with no experience. Just before the CA people were laid off, a manager went around with a clip board and asked them what the TX people should know. Duh. This is not unique to Boeing, but a corporate trend that people are just numbers with no unique skills or knowledge. Replace the older guys (and gals) with fresh out of school (read cheaper) people.
Even if they had known about the damage, I'm not sure they had a alternate way to get the crew home safely. There was no other shuttle ready to go. :(

Re: NASA Investigation Pointing at Tank Foam in Columbia Demise
 

But there is the rub. No one said it was OK. Literally tens of requests from mutliple sources demanded more information because so many were so worried. But Dittemore (and maybe others) denied or canceled those requests - repeatedly.

I remember commentary from the Sensor officer who predicted what symptoms would be if the Shuttle were disintegrating. As the Shuttle was coming in, he was stating exactly what he said would happen upon failure. He said it in a calm voice - knowing full well what he might be reporting as he said it.

The point this investigation appears to be coming to is that, well, I have posted it often: 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management.

Not quite. The Boeing TX people told NASA they didn't think the foam strike was a problem. Of course after the fact, there was a pull out all the stops, no holds bared, investigation by *experienced* people.

That's what top managers (actually I beleive it is United Space Alliance, a Boeing joint venture) said. In the meantime, engineers were not so sure. For example, a computer simulation predicted a 24 inch to 36 inch slice in that insulation. But managers said the simulation was run with too much foam weight or that the simulation was not reliable. A classic example of "lying by telling half truths". Yes the simulation was not as reliable as required because engineers were using the best that they had. They had insufficient data, knew they have insufficient data, and repeatedly requested more data. Management somehow turned that into "everything is OK"

Sally Ride's comments iterate this problem. She describes management failures similar to management failures that destroyed Challenger. Ride was also on the Roger's Commission that investigated Challenger.

They are not accidents. Failures are directly traceable to humans.