Its not just GM that is much worse than the spread sheets suggest. Delphi is the major parts supplier for GM products. GM is so dependant on Delphi - a GM spinoff - that the health of Delphi will impact GM.
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From The Economist of 12 Mar 2005:
The pessimists were given reason to worry that things will get far worse when the world's biggest car-parts firm, Delphi, confessed last week that it had cooked its books. ... Visteon, formerly Ford's in-house supplier, lives on only thanks to a series of costly bail-outs by its former parent .... If Visteon survives, it will be because its size makes the disruptions its demise would cause too large for Ford to allow. ... Other suppliers to declare bankruptcy recently include Intermet, Venture Industries, and Oxford Automotive. As Detroit waits for the next domino to fall, it is becoming clear that this is a game that none of its local favorites can win.
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GM had been cutting costs by demaning price concessions from their suppliers. They had been using future profits from their finance groups to maintain sales today (ie 0% financing). GM was using every sales incentive just to maintain market share - which they lost anyway. 25% of GM products are sold in sales incentives to employees and employees of their parts suppliers. Even the so profitable GM Europe that kept GM looking profitable so many years ago is losing money after GM refused to provide capital to redesign their European product line. Look under the sheets. Because GM has refused to innovate (as demonstrated by America's need for more oil), things are even worse than they appear on the bed cover.
On 16 Mar 2000, The Economist noted this deal:
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GM was taking 20% of Fiat Auto, in exchange for 5% of its own equity, making the Italians GM’s biggest shareholder. In another world or another age, this might have been a full takeover (indeed, thanks to GM’s option to buy the rest of the firm between 2003 and 2008, it may yet become one). But Italian honour and the Agnellis’ pride had to be satisfied—hence the second-best solution of an alliance rather than a takeover. The two firms will form joint ventures for buying car parts, for making engines, gearboxes and transmissions and for car-purchase financing, in both Europe and Latin America. In a few years they will have a single chassis and power train, to underpin all their small cars. But they will not pool their assembly capacity and they will compete in every market except North America, where GM will help to sell Alfa Romeos. No European factory will close. In a region with 25% too much capacity, that eliminates a big chance for cutting costs.
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GM just paid Fiat about $2billion to get out of this deal. Even the famous 1984 reorganization was a flop: from The Economist of 8 Oct 1998
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So far GM’s reorganisations have tended to fall into two categories—catastrophic and ineffectual. The most catastrophic was the huge restructuring in 1984, which set off an ill-fated $80 billion spending-spree on technology, and also split its American division into two groups—BOC (officially “Buick-Oldsmobile-Cadillac”, unofficially “Big Overpriced Cars”) and CPC (“Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada” or “Cheap Plastic Cars”). Most of the restructurings since then have been incremental.
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What did that restructuring accomplish? Innovation that once came from independent divisions was now under the direct control of MBA dominated corporate bosses. In that same article, they also note:
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GM’s shares have underperformed the stockmarket by around 70% in the past decade, continuing a dismal tradition. Even more staggeringly, all GM’s stockmarket value is accounted for by its financing operation (GMAC), its parts company (Delphi) and its 74% stake in Hughes Electronics. Other car firms also make money on financing and parts, but rarely do investors implicitly value the vehicle-making side as worthless, or even a liability. What GM’s shareholders are saying, in effect, is that they would pay you to take the world’s biggest industrial operation off their hands.
This is damning. But it is also a mark of GM’s potential. If GM could only make cars as well as its competitors, it would be worth twice what it is today.
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So how anti-innovative has GM been? Between 1993 and 2000, the government provided GM with over $100million on the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV). So where are the hybrid products from all that research and concept cars? GM could not bother to develop products from that research. The Japanese have the hybrids and are licensing the technology to American automakers.
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