14 Aug Blackout - Final Report

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An industry gets government regulation that it deserves. Final Report on the 14 Aug 2003 blackout created by First Energy was issued today:

from the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force Final Report
Chapter 10 includes a total of 46 recommendations, but the single most important of them is that the U.S. Congress should enact the reliability provisions in H.R. 6 and S. 2095 to make compliance with reliability standards mandatory and enforceable. If that could be done, many of the other recommended actions could be accomplished readily in the course of implementing the legislation.

Of course 85% of all problems are directly traceable to top management. The Final Report apparently agrees:

Although the causes discussed below produced the failures and events of August 14, they did not leap into being that day. Instead, as the following chapters explain, they reflect long-standing institutional failures and weaknesses that need to be understood and corrected in order to maintain reliability.

The report, slightly modified from the preliminary report assigns blame on specific organizations - most specifically First Energy:

Group 1:
A) FE failed to conduct rigorous long-term planning studies of its system, and neglected to conduct appropriate multiple contingency or extreme condition assessments.
B) FE did not conduct sufficient voltage analyses for its Ohio control area and used operational voltage criteria that did not reflect actual voltage stability conditions and needs.
C) ECAR (FE’s reliability council) did not conduct an independent review or analysis of FE’s voltage criteria and operating needs, thereby allowing FE to use inadequate practices without correction.
D)Some of NERC’s planning and operational requirements and standards were sufficiently ambiguous that FE could interpret them to include practices that were inadequate for reliable system operation.
Group 2:
A) FE failed to ensure the security of its transmission system after significant unforeseen contingencies because it did not use an effective contingency analysis capability on a routine basis.
B) FE lacked procedures to ensure that its operators were continually aware of the functional state of their critical monitoring tools.
C) FE control center computer support staff and operations staff did not have effective internal communications procedures.
D) FE lacked procedures to test effectively the functional state of its monitoring tools after repairs were made.
E) FE did not have additional or back-up monitoring tools to understand or visualize the status of their transmission system to facilitate its operators’ understanding of transmission system conditions after the failure of their primary monitoring/alarming systems.
Group 3:
FE failed to manage adequately tree growth in its transmission rights-of-way. This failure was the common cause of the outage of three FE 345-kV transmission lines and one 138-kV line.
Group 4:
A) MISO did not have real-time data from Dayton Power and Light’s Stuart-Atlanta 345-kV line incorporated into its state estimator (a system monitoring tool). This precluded MISO from becoming aware of FE’s system problems earlier and providing diagnostic assistance or direction to FE.
B) MISO’s reliability coordinators were using non-real-time data to support real-time “flowgate” monitoring. This prevented MISO from detecting an N-1 security violation in FE’s system and from assisting FE in necessary relief actions.
C) MISO lacked an effective way to identify the location and significance of transmission line breaker operations reported by their Energy Management System (EMS). Such information would have enabled MISO operators to become aware earlier of important line outages.
D) PJM and MISO lacked joint procedures or guidelines on when and how to coordinate a security limit violation observed by one of them in the other’s area due to a contingency near their common boundary.

Group 1 2 and 3 are problems directly traceable to First Energy management - bean counter mentalities - who had absoutely no technical experience or education. Top management and Board of Direcctors were trained MBAs or lawyers. When technical people had been citing these problems well in advance, then those bean counter mentalities could only respond from a cost control perspective - cut costs to increase profits.

The number of examples summarized by groups 1 thru 3 are appalling. For example, First Energy control room operators were so starved for accurate information as to not even understand the blackout was happening. Events began sometime after 1 PM. FE operators finally conceded something must be wrong at 15:56 - about 15 minutes before they would blackout NE America. Trees underneath major power lines had to be less than 36 feet. But to cut costs, First Energy had permitted those trees to grow to 42 feet. As a result, at least three major and overloaded power lines short circuited to trees. Still that should not have caused a blackout - because the nation and even FE have more than sufficient equipment. But First Energy did not even have load shedding plans - to cut off customers if FE could not supply sufficient power. As 16 more power lines shorted to earth, FE still could not shed customer loads in the Akron Cleveland. Unacceptable even to anyone without science education. And yet FE top management remains - and is that anti-American.

Group 4 is are more problems long previously identified. For example, First Energy did not want the MISO (reliability controller) to have much power over their operations (maybe to cheat more on line loading and reactive power outputs from their generators - to increase profits). MISO lacked both enforcement powers and even necessary real time information to perform its job. MISO employees were even on FE's payroll.

Chapter 4 states:

... the system was in a reliable operational state at 15:05 EDT on August 14, 2003, ... It means that none of the electrical conditions on the system before 15:05 EDT was a direct cause of the [16:08 EDT] blackout.

One final point. Never forget the George Jr response to this blackout. Administration claimed before and after that we had insufficient energy sources; the obsolete grid could not support the load. That was an obvious lie even back before August 2003. But many brainwashed by Rush Limbaugh (an administration mouthpiece) would not have known this fact - and it was a well known and published fact.

This Final Report only repeats that fact - we don't have a shortage of energy generation nor an obsolete power grid. We have a shortage of control - in particular top management who also are major campaign 'bribery' contributors to the Bush/Cheney campaign. The president lied about a need for more energy. We have a management problem (including the president). Management who then run to the president even for protection from unfair (cough) competition - or to even keep a defective nuclear power plant operating. Take each point in this final report. They are all traceable to bean counter management in First Energy Corporation. Classic example of anti-American (people who not only stifle innovation and basic solutions) management reamins in First Energy management.

While it was possible to operate the system securely despite those vulnerabilities [in the Akron Cleveland area], FirstEnergy was not doing so because the company had not conducted the long-term and operational planning studies needed to understand those vulnerabilities and their operational implications.

Why authorize studies that would only cost money.

One need not have any technical knowledge to comprehend Chapters 1 thru 3 of Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations