What Iraqis Really Think

[aimeecc]

Originally Posted by tw

No sarin or mustard gas weapons were found. None. Nada. Even the production facilities - the 'surge capacity' - did not exist - in direct opposition to what you have posted. I checked it out long ago. I learned the facts by asking damning questions. Did you? Or did you just believe the first thing you were told? That would make you a perfect target for Rush Limbaugh and Pat Robertson.

You are the one spinning, so quit the accusations and do a google search. Almost every mainstream media reported on the finds. Or do I have to google for you? Or do you not believe the news? I can't find one mainstream media that claims it was a hoax of any sort. Or do you have your own intelligence agency you get your spin from?

I'm not a Limbaugh fan, can't say I've heard him in years.

Oh what the heck, I'll google for you for news
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...081300530.html
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/i...aq-sarin_x.htm
www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,120137,00.html

And don't forget the entire ISG findings, in which you cherry picked.
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profil...cal/index.html
Since you cherry pick your points, I will mine. Actually, I leave the majority in

On 30 September 2004 the ISG released its final report on Iraq's WMD programs. Its key findings regarding Iraqi chemical weapons programs were as follows.

Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable.

Iraq's CW program was crippled by the Gulf War and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base.

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf War and UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions.

Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence operations.

ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.